The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2015

Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems
Ming-Min Peng

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
Peng, Ming-Min (1973) "Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems," Akron Law Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 9.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Peng: Political Offences In Taiwan

POLITICAL OFFENCES IN TAIWAN:
LAWS AND PROBLEMS
MING-MIN PENG*

AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT

of the Chinese People's Republic in

• 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Government moved to the island of
Taiwan and chose the city of Taipei as its new capital.1 In the 20 years
since then, the Nationalist Government has maintained a state of
"national emergency" over the whole area under its control, and
administered it under martial law. It is the avowed intention of the
Government to perpetuate the present situation until the day of its
reconquest of the whole of China, that is, indefinitely.
The situation is unique in modern political and legal history, among
other reasons, for the position taken domestically and internationally
by the Nationalist Government in the past two decades, the length of
the period of "national emergency" maintained and martial law enforced
and the degree to which the very existence of the regime hinges on
maintaining and prolonging the present state of affairs.
The subject of this study is what the politically restrictive laws
in Taiwan are which have been playing the most decisive role in the
politics of "national emergency" of the Nationalist Government, how
they operate in practice, how they square with the official Chinese
Nationalist Constitution and what the impact is of these laws on
the Chinese Nationalist legal system.
2. The basic point to be noted is that since 1949 not only the
scope of the actual jurisdiction of the Nationalist Government has
drastically contracted, but at the same time, the judicial system with
which the Government functions has undergone a structural change. On
19 May 1949, in the name of the Peace Preservation Command of

*B.A., National Taiwan University; L.L.M., McGill; Docteur en Drois, Paris.
Formerly, Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan
University; Adviser, Chinese Delegation to the United Nations; Visiting Professor,
University of Michigan Law School; Currently, Visiting Professor, Department of

Political Science, Wright State University. Reprinted with the permission of The
China Quarterly.

1The sphere over which the Nationalist Government exercises effective control was
reduced in 1949 from the 3,880,000 square miles and 450 million people of the whole
of China to Taiwan proper, the Pescadores and the tiny islands of Quemoy and

Matsu off the east coast of China, with combined dimensions of about 13,890 square
miles and 11 million people. Of the population of Taiwan, 85 per cent. are native
Taiwanese, the rest are Chinese who followed the Nationalist Government to the
islands after the Second World War.
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the Chinese Nationalist Army, 2 a general "state of siege" was proclaimed
over the whole area of Taiwan.3 The subsequent social, political and
legal consequences of this order have been such that it is of interest
to reproduce its full text here:
A. In order to secure public peace and order, a state of siege is
hereby declared by this Command over the whole province [of
Taiwan], effective from zero hour, 20 May [1949].
B. Effective from the same date, all ports shall be closed and
strictly off limits, except the three ports of Keelung, Kaohsiung
and Makung which shall remain open under surveillance of this
Command, which will regulate the maritime communication lines
of this province.
C. During the period of the state of siege, the following
regulative and prohibitive rules shall be enforced:
1. Effective from the same date, a general curfew shall be
enforced in the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung every day
from 1.00 a.m. to 5.00 a.m., during which all traffic is
forbidden except with special permit.
2. All stores and public entertainment places in Keelung and
Kaohsiung must be closed by midnight.
3. All stores and hawkers in this province are forbidden to
raise commodity prices, to close their businesses, to stockpile
the daily necessities or to disrupt the market.
4. All incoming and outgoing travellers must go through
procedures as prescribed by this Command and submit to
inspection.
5. Public meetings, strikes, demonstrations or petitions are
strictly forbidden.
6. Spreading of rumours by letter, slogan or other means is
strictly forbidden.
7. Carrying by civilians of arms, ammunition or dangerous
articles is strictly forbidden.
8. All inhabitants, whether indoors or outdoors, must carry
their identification. papers. Those who do not shall be
arrested.

2 This is the predecessor of the present Garrison Command of the Chinese Nationalist
Army.
3 According to Article 39 of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution of 1947, the

President may declare martial law only with the approval of, or subject to
confirmation by, the Congress (Legislative Yuan), and when the Congress deems it
necessary, it may by resolution request the President to terminate martial law. But
since 10 May 1948, the National Assembly has given the President the power "during
the period of Communist rebellion" to take emergency measures without being subjeot
to the restriction prescribed in this constitutional clause.
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D. During the period of the state of siege, those who commit
the following acts shall be condemned to death in accordance with
law:
1. Circulating rumours and beguiling the public.
2. Inciting the public to riot.
3. Disrupting the money market.
4. Forceful theft or robbery.
5. Striking by workers or traders disrupting public order.
6. Encouraging students to strike or publicly inciting others
to commit crime.
7. Destroying traffic or communications, or stealing the
materials thereof.
8. Disrupting water supplies, or electric or gas services.
9. Setting fires or causing flood and endangering the public
safety.
10. Possessing arms, ammunition or explosives without per4
mission.
Furthermore, this proclamation of the state of siege automatically
carried into operation the whole body of martial law promulgated by the
Chinese Nationalist Government on 29 November 1934.5 Thus, in
accordance with Article 7 of the Martial Law, local administrative and
judicial matters are placed under the charge of the local military
commander, to whom both local administrative officials and judges are
responsible. Article 8 of the above law further provides that during the
period of enforcement of martial law the military, organ may try, by itself,
certain offences including those against the internal and external security
of the state, and those against public order and public safety. Article 11
empowers the military commander, if he deems it necessary, to stop or
disperse assemblies, associations, demonstrations or petitions, and put
controls on speech, teaching, newspapers, magazines, notices, posters and
other publications. The military commander may also restrict or prohibit
religious activities; he may prohibit strikes by traders, workers, students
and others, and force the strikers to resume work; he may censor mail and
telegrams and withold or confiscate them; he may inspect incoming or
outgoing vessels, vehicles, aircraft and other conveyances and stop their
traffic or block their primary routes; he may examine doubtful passengers,
inspect private weapons, ammunition, arms, firearms or other dangerous

4 Declaration of the State of Siege, Taiwan Peace Preservation Command, 19 May

1949. The translation of this Declaration is the author's. In later citations, unless

otherwise noted, the translations follow those of the Laws of the Republic of China,
First Series: Major Laws, trans. and comp. by Law Revision Planning Group, CUSA,

The Executive Yuan, The Republic of China (Taipei, Taiwan, 1961).

5 Promulgated on 29 November 1934 and amended on 19 May 1948 and on 14

January 1949.
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articles, and withhold or confiscate them; he may carry out an examination
of constructions, vessels and doubtful dwelling houses; he may order the
inhabitants to evacuate or prohibit them from moving in; he may destroy
properties of the people, and conduct inspections, investigations or
registrations of civilian foodstuffs and other resources.
It can be said that the main significance of the proclamation
of the state of siege in 1949 and the practical effect of the martial law
are threefold:
First, by their sweeping generality, they have, since 1949, placed
major parts of community life in Taiwan under the control and
surveillance of the military authorities, that is, of the Garrison Command
of the Chinese Nationalist Army.
Second, they have in fact suspended most of the guarantees and
protections of individual rights and freedom written into the Chinese
6
Nationalist Constitution. For example, Article 8 of the Constitution,
7
which guarantees personal freedom, Article 10, which guarantees
freedom of residence and of change of residence, Article 11, which
8
guarantees freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication, Article
9
12, which guarantees freedom of privacy of correspondence, Article 13,
10
Article 14, which
which guarantees freedom of religious belief,

The Constitution of the Republic of China, adopted by the National Assembly on
26 December 1946, promulgated by the National Government on 1 January 1947 and
effective from 25 December 1947.
7 Article 8:
Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case of flagrante
delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise
than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or
punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
may be resisted.
When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed
a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing inform the
said person and his designated relative or friend of the grounds for his arrest
or detention, and shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for
trial. The said person, or any other person, may petition the competent court
that a writ be served within 24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the
surrender of the said person for trial.
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall it order the organ concerned to make an investigation and
report first. The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in
executing, the writ of the court for the surrender of the said person for trial.
When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ, he or any
other person may petition the court for an investigation. The court shall not
reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action of the
organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance with law.
8 Article 11: "The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and
publication."
9 Article 12: "The people shall have freedom of privacy of correspondence."
10 Article 13: "The people shall have freedom of religious belief."
6
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guarantees freedom of assembly and of association," Article 16,
which guarantees the right of presenting petitions or lodging complaints12
-all have been suspended in practice.
Third, the proclamation and the martial law have radically changed
the judicial system in Taiwan by also suspending in effect Article 9
of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution which guarantees that except
service, no person shall be subject to trial
for those in active military
3
by a military tribunal.'
3. The new judicial situation brought about by the proclamation of
the state of siege and the martial law has its deepest impact with regard
to political offences committed under the Chinese Nationalist regime in
Taiwan. Here political offences are understood as crimes which are
incidental to and form a part of political disturbances, including offences
consisting in an attack upon the political order of things established
in the country where committed, as well as offences committed to obtain
any political object.14 To discuss political offences in Taiwan, some other
laws and a judicial interpretation must first be mentioned. These are the
15
Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, and the Statute for Denunciation
17
16
and Suppression of Rebels, the Military Trial Law and the Judicial
8
Number 68, 26
Interpretation of the Control of Grand Justices,
November 1956.19 Together with the proclamation of the state of
siege and the martial law, these laws and the Judicial Interpretation
constitute the main legal basis on which the Chinese Nationalist
Government tries political offences in Taiwan. Read together, these
laws and the Judicial Interpretation shed light on Nationalist policy

1 Article 14: "The people shall have freedom of assembly and of association."
Article 16: "The people shall have the right of presenting petitions, lodging complaints, or instituting legal proceedings."
13 Article 9: "Except those in active military service, no person shall be subject to
trial by a military tribunal."
14Black's Law Dictionary 1319 (4th ed. 1951).
15 Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, promulgated on 21 June 1949, that is, 33 days
after the proclamation of the state of siege, and amended on 26 April 1950 and on
26 July 1958. All citations from this law are the author's translation.
16 Statute for Denunciation and Supression of Rebels, promulgated on 13 June 1950,
and amended on 28 December 1954. All citations from this law are the author's
translation.
17 Military Trial Law, promulgated on 7 July 1956 and amended on 24 December
1959.
18 The Council of Grand Justices was established by Article 79 of the Constitution.
Its function, in the words of the Constitution, is to interpret the Constitution and
to "unify the interpretation of laws and orders." Its interpretations are legally binding.
19 Judicial Interpretation, Council of Grand Justices, No. 68, 26 November 1956. All
citations from this Judicial Interpretation are the author's translation.
12
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towards political offences since the Government's retreat to Taiwan, and
bring into relief the following distinctive features:
1. The enlarged scope of political offences.
2. Increased penalties for political offences.
3. Military trial of political offences and its summary character.
4. Exceptional provisions and practices for political offences.
5. The political detention system.

(i) The enlarged scope of political offences
Before 1949, the main law under the Chinese Nationalist regime
which dealt with political offences was the Criminal Code. 20 Chapters I
and II of Part Two of the Criminal Code are entitled: "Offences Against
the Internal Security of the State" 21 and "Offences Against the External
Security of the State, '2 2 respectively. But when the state of siege was
proclaimed in 1949,23 not only did the text of the proclamation itself
provide new categories of political offences which were punishable by
death, the martial law 24 also carried into operation Article 2 of the
Criminal Law of the Armed Forces, 25 according to which this law,
although applicable only to military personnel under ordinary circumstances, shall also apply to non-military personnel who commit certain
political offences during the period of enforcement of martial law. In
addition, as mentioned above, two new laws have been enacted since 1949
which are aimed specifically at political offences, namely the Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion 26 and the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels.27 As the above proclamation and laws came successively
into effect, the scope of political offences was broadened considerably. At
the present time, political offences in Taiwan include, in addition to the
ones commonly provided for by laws in many countries, such acts as
28
strike, petition, demonstration, public meeting, spreading of rumours, etc.

20 Criminal Code, promulgated on 1 January 1935, effective from 1 July 1935 and
amended on 7 November 1948, 21 July 1954 and 23 October 1954.
21 Chapter
1, Criminal Code.
22 Chapter II, Criminal Code.
23 See n. 4 above.
24 See n. 5 above.
25 Criminal Law of the Armed Forces, promulgated on 25 September 1924, effective
from 25 September 1925, amended on 19 July 1937.
26 See n. 15 above.
27
See n. 16 above.
28 For the acts which, at the present time, constitute political crimes for civilians
under Nationalist laws see Appendix, below, p. 491.
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(ii) Increased penaltiesfor politicaloffences
The penalties for the new categories of political offences prescribed
in the Chinese Nationalist laws after 1949 are remarkably severe and the
penalties for certain political offences already written into law prior to
1949 have also been greatly increased. For example, according to Article
100 (I) of the official Criminal Code of the Nationalist Government of
1935, 29 a person who "undertakes to destroy the national polity, seize
state territory, change the constitution by illegal means or overthrow the
government"30 may be punished with imprisonment for not less than seven
years; however, Article 2 (I) of the Statute for Punishment of Rebellion
of 1949 makes capital punishment mandatory for the same offence.31
Although according to Article 100 (II) of the Criminal Code of 1935, a
person who "prepares or conspires to commit the above offence" is
punishable with imprisonment for not less than six months and not more
than five years,3 2 Article 2 (III) of the Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion of 1949 prescribes for the same offence a penalty of imprisonment for not less than 10 years.3 3 In the same vein, the Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion of 1949 makes capital punishment mandatory
for the offences prescribed in Articles 101 (I), 34 103 (1)35 and 104 (I) 3
of the Criminal Code of 193537; while the Code provides for imprisonment
of upwards of seven years. The Statute for Punishment of Rebellion
provides a penalty of not less than 10 years' imprisonment 38 for the

29See n. 20 above.
30 1, Article 100, Criminal Code, see n. 20 above.
31, Article 2, Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, see n.15 above.
32 11, Article 100, Criminal Code, see n. 20 above.
33 III, Article 2, Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, see n. 15 above.
341, Article 101, Criminal Code: "A person who with violence commits an offence
specified in paragraph I of the preceding article [see n. 30 above] shall be punished
with imprisonment for life or for not less than seven years; a ringleader shall be
punished with death or imprisonment for life."
35 1, Article 103, Criminal Code: "A person who communicates with a foreign state
or its agent with intent that such state or another state begin war against the Republic
of China shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life."
36 1, Aricle 104, Criminal Code: "A person who communicates with a foreign state
or its agent with intent to subject territory of the Republic of China to such state or
another state shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life."
37
See n.20 above.
38 The last paragraph, Article 2, Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, see n. 15 above.
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offences prescribed in Articles 101 (II),39 103 (III)40 and 104 (HII) 41
of the Criminal Code, 42 while the Code's penalties range from one to
10 years' imprisonment. Furthermore, according to Article 8 (I) of the
Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, in most cases of political offences,
all property of the offender shall be confiscated, even when the offender
has not yet been formally tried or dies before the trial.4 This is an
additional penalty which did not exist before 1949.

(iii) Military trialof politicaloffences and its summary character
By virtue of the proclamation of the state of siege on 19 May
1949," and Articles 7 and 8 of the Martial Law,45 which were brought
into operation by the proclamation, political offences have been placed
since 1949 under the jurisdiction of a military court. The procedure for
courtmartial is provided by the Military Trial Law. 46 As prescribed in
Part Two, Chapters I147 and 11148 of this law, the military trial consists
of two instances. But verbal arguments upon law and facts are made
only at the first instance. The second (final) instance is expedited only in
writing, without verbal arguments. 49 This summary system is a deviation
from ordinary judicial procedure applied to civilians in Taiwan.

(iv) Exceptional provisionsand practices for political offences
In addition to the summary nature of the military trial of political
offences, particular legislation and judicial interpretations have been
made, or practices established, to give the Government maximum freedom
in prosecuting and punishing political offenders. These special rules have
the effect of excluding political offences from the application of certain
established legal principles incorporated into the Chinese Nationalist
judicial system for the protection of the defendant. As a result:

3911, Article 101, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit an
offence specified in the preceding paragraph [see n. 34 above] shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years."
40 111, Article 103, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit
an offence specified in Paragraph I [see n. 35 above] shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than three and not more than 10 years."
41 I1, Article 104, Criminal Code: "A person who prepares or conspires to commit
an offence specified in Paragraph I [see n. 36 above] shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than three and not more than 10 years."
42
See n. 20 above.
43
Article 8, Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, see n. 15 above.
44 See n. 4 above.
45
See n. 5 above.
46 Military Trial Law, promulgated on 7 July 1956, effective from 1 October 1956,
amended on 24 December 1956.
47
Articles 136 to 186, Military Trial Law.
40
Articles 187 to 216, Military Trial Law.
49
Article 199, Military Trial Law.
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1. The limitation on the right of prosecution is not applicable
in practice to cases of political offences. According to Article 80 of
the Criminal Code, the right of prosecution of criminal offences is
barred by limitation if not exercised within a certain period of time
(the length of which varies from one to 20 years according to the
relative gravity of the crime). 50 But this limitation was struck down
51
in effect by the Judicial Interpretation mentioned above, which ruled
that, once committed, a political offence should be regarded as still in
52
a "state of continuity" until it is prosecuted. This Interpretation leaves
no room for application of the provisions in the Criminal Code on the
limitation of the right of prosecution. Accordingly, the military courts
in trials of political
have been prosecuting and gaining convictions
53
offences committed more than two decades ago.
2. The principle of prohibition of ex post facto law is not applicable
to political offences. This prohibition has been accepted by the Chinese
Nationalist Criminal Code,M Article 1 of which expressly provides that "an
act is punishable only if expressly so provided by the law in force at the
time of its commission." Article 2 (1) additionally provides that if the law
at the time of the act and the law at the time of the trial are different, the
law most favourable to the offender shall apply. Nevertheless this principle
has been in fact nullified with regard to political offences. The Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion, after stipulating in Article 8 (I), the confiscation
of offenders' property as an additional penalty for most cases of political
offences, goes further and in Article 8 (III), expressly excludes in this
regard the application of the protection of Article 2 (I) of the Criminal
Code. In more general terms, the foregoing Judicial Interpretation of
the Council of Grand Justices, with its conception of the "continuity"
of political offence, has struck down in practice the prohibition of
ex post facto law for political offences, making it possible for the military
courts to apply law retrospectively to an act committed prior to the
enactment of the law. Accordingly, the military courts have been freely
prosecuting and convicting political offenders for acts committed before

50

Article 80, Criminal Code.
18, 19 above.

51 Seen.

The wording of the Judicial Interpretation is: "Whoever once belonged to a
rebellious organization shall be regarded as continually belonging to such until he
52

surrenders himself." The Nationalist Government and its courts have always considered any dissent to be necessarily linked to a wide anti-governmental conspiracy,
real or imaginary, and in their view any political offender is, by definition, a member

of a "rebellious organization." So the above interpretation in fact covers the whole
range of political offences.
53 E.g., the cases of Fan Tzu-wen, Kuo I-tung (Po-yang), Ch'ui Hsiao-p'ing, Ma
Cheng-hai, Lo Heng, Chiang Hal-jung and Shih Yu-wei.
54 See n. 20 above.
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the passage of laws. With the limitation on the right of prosecution
and the prohibition of ex post facto law both lacking in practice, the
Government has indeed great freedom in dealing with the opposition.
3. The immunities and privileges of the members of legislatures are
not recognized with regard to political offences. Article 73 of the Chinese
Nationalist Constitution,5 5 provides that "No member of the Legislative
Yuan shall be held responsible outside the Yuan for opinions expressed
or votes cast in the Yuan," and Article 74 of the Constitution further
states, "No member of the Legislative Yuan shall, except in case of
flagrante delicto, be arrested or detained without the permission of the
Legislative Yuan." Similar provisions are found in Articles 33 and 34 of
the Constitution of the Provincial Assembly of Taiwan, 56 and in Articles
40 and 42 of the Constitution of City and County Councils in
Taiwan.57 Articles 32, 33, 101 and 102 of the Chinese Nationalist
Constitution 5 8 accord the same immunities and privileges to the members
of the National Assembly and to the members of the Control Yuan.
However, as a matter of practice, those immunities and privileges are not
recognized with regard to political offences. When a member of the
legislature, central or provincial, is suspected of a political offence, he is
arrested without the permission of the legislature even if it is not flagrante
delicto or even if the legislature is in session. A member of the legislature
is held criminally responsible for an opinion expressed in it if the opinion
constitutes a political offence according to the laws mentioned above.5 9
4. No remission of punishment is accorded to political offenders
under age. According to Article 18 (I) of the Criminal Code, "an
act committed by a person who has not completed the fourteenth
year of his age is not punishable." However, this provision is not
applied in cases of political offence. In a recent case, two persons
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms for the acts they committed
60
25 years ago when they were less than 14 years old.
5. The leniencies given to a criminal offender's family who has
shielded the offender are not applicable to political offences. While
according to Article 164 of the Criminal Code, 6 ' a person who shields
or attempts to shield an offender is punishable, Article 167 of the same
code provides that if an offender's spouse, or relative by marriage within

55 See n. 6 above.

56 Constitution of the Provincial Assembly of Taiwan, promulgated on 26 August 1959.
57 Constitution of City and County Councils, promulgated on 21 November 1963,
amended on 4 June 1966.
58 See n. 6 above.
59 E.g., the cases of Lin Shui-ch'uan, Sung Lin-k'ang and Ma Cheng-feng.

60 The case of the brothers Mou Shao-heng and Mou Ch'i-yu.
61 See n. 20 above.
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the third degree of relationship, or relative by blood within the fifth
degree of relationship shields the offender, his penalty shall be reduced
or remitted. This provision has been nullified with regard to the political
offender by Article 4 of the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of
Rebels 62 which stipulates that everyone is under an obligation to denounce
"rebels," and by Article 9 of the same statute which prescribes a
penalty of imprisonment for one to seven years for anyone who
knowingly fails to denounce a "rebel." Basing their decisions on these
articles, the military courts have been prosecuting and convicting the
spouses, parents, children, brothers, sisters and close relatives of political
63
offenders for having failed to denounce them.
6. The system of release on parole is not applicable to political
offenders. The system of release on parole is incorporated into Chapter
64
X, Part One, of the Criminal Code, which is entitled "Conditional
Release." Nevertheless, it is well-established practice that this system
is not applicable to political offenders, who must serve the full term
of their penalties.
The political detention system
According to Article 8 (I) (b) of the Statute for Denunciation and
Suppression of Rebels,63 "those who commit lesser [political] offences
and need reform shall be sent for reform." As supplement to this, two
administrative orders have been issued, namely the Measures for Control
of Hooligans During the Enforcement of Martial Law in Taiwan" and
the Measures for the Reform of Rebels During the Period of Communist
Rebellion. 67 Accordingly, when one is not formally convicted on the
basis of any of the laws mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, one is
still subject to the possibility of internment by an order from the Garrison
Command. As a matter of practice, the order for internment is given
when the Government, while having suspicions concerning a person's
thought or behaviour, is unable to find sufficient basis for formal
prosecution and conviction, and simply decides to "reform" the person's
thoughts. This order is carried out by the Garrison Command without
need for any judicial procedure and without any means of appeal for
(v)

62

See n.16 above.
E.g., the case of Mrs. Su Tung-ch'i.
64
See n. 20 above.
65 See n. 16 above.
66
Measures for the Control of Hooligans During the Enforcement of Martial Law in
Taiwan, jointly issued by the Taiwan Provincial Government and the Taiwan Peace
Preservation Command (i.e., the predecessor of the present Taiwan Garrison
63

Command) on 30 April 1952.
67 Measures

for the Reform of Rebels During the Period of Communist Rebellion,

issued by the Executive Yuan on 4 May 1957 and amended on 3 December 1957.
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the detained. 8 The period of internment is three years for one term,
renewable indefinitely. Thus this system of political internment may in
fact amount to life imprisonment without trial. When the question of
the constitutionality of the above Measures is raised, the Government
sometimes turns to the Peace Preservation Measures prescribed in Part
One, Chapter XII of the Criminal Code6 9 to justify the detention
system. But those provisions in the Criminal Code are applicable, by
their own words, only to one who is a minor, or one who is insane,
feeble-minded, deaf and dumb or alcoholic, or one who takes opium,
morphine injections, cocaine or heroin, or one who makes the commission
of crime a habit or profession, or commits an offence because of habits
of loitering or vagrancy (Articles 86-90, Criminal Code). It would require
a very tortuous interpretation of language--or a sense of humour-to
advance the above provisions as legal basis for political detention. The
truth is that this system is an extra-legal method used by the Nationalist
Government to cope efficiently with political opposition.
4. The Chinese Nationalist Government justifies the adoption of
the above laws and measures on the grounds that it is at war with the
Chinese Communist Government and that those laws and measures are
necessary for the maintenance of security and order in Taiwan. Before
commenting further on the technical characteristics of the laws, it would
be useful here to appraise the whole set of Chinese Nationalist laws concerning political offences in a broader context. Seen in perspective against
the legal status of Taiwan itself and the position of the Chinese Nationalist
Government therein, these laws reveal some remarkable peculiarities.
First, there is the legal status of Taiwan. The Cairo Declaration of
1943 stated that "Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores" were to be
"restored to the Republic of China." This intention was reaffirmed by the
Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 and the Instrument of Surrender
by Japan. The basic assumption of the Allied Powers at that time was
that the people of Taiwan desired to be incorporated into China. But the
Civil War in China following the end of the Pacific War, the establishment
of the Communist Government in 1949 and the open revolts of the
inhabitants in Taiwan against the Chinese Nationalist Government after
its taking over of the island brought about a basic change which compels
a reappraisal of the whole situation. The involvement of Taiwan and the
Pescadores in the Chinese Civil War was never foreseen or even
contemplated by the co-signers of the Cairo Declaration. This is a typical
case in which the principle of rebus sic stantibus is bound to be invoked
as a basis for re-examination of an existing international agreement.
Moreover, the Cairo Declaration was no more than a wartime statement
68 E.g., the cases of Fu Chen (Chung-mei), Yen Ming-sheng, Yu Hsi-ming.
69 See n. 20 above.
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of the expectation of the four Allied Powers at the time when the war
was still going on, its outcome uncertain, with Japan still in firm
possession of Taiwan. Therefore, the above expectation could have no
legal effect unless it were incorporated into a peace treaty with Japan. The
Peace Treaty signed between Japan and the Allied Powers in 1952 and
the Peace Treaty signed between the Nationalist Government and Japan
in 1952 merely stated that Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to
Formosa and the Pescadores," but nowhere did these treaties specify the
beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation. On the other hand, the Atlantic
Charter of 1941 stated that there should be "no territorial changes that
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides that "the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples" should be one of the
basic guiding principles of international relations, and the Charter further
stipulates in Article 103 that in the event of conflict between the
obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreements, the
obligations under the Charter shall prevail. In view of the foregoing, so
far as Taiwan is concerned, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam
Declaration not only lack legal effect, they violate the letter and spirit of
the United Nations Charter and must be regarded as superseded by the
latter. Therefore, from the point of view of international law, it can only
be said that Taiwan was detached from Japan, but has not been attached
status has been
to any other country. That is, Taiwan's international legal
70
undetermined since the end of the Second World War.
Second, there is the position of the Chinese Nationalist Government.
This Government was asked to accept the Japanese surrender in Taiwan
and the Pescadores on behalf of the allied powers in 1945, and continues
to constitute an army of belligerent occupation on the islands. This status

70For a more detailed discussion of the international legal status of Taiwan
(Formosa), see: J. P. Jain, "The Legal Status of Formosa," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. LVII (January 1963), pp. 25-45; Kiansin Ko, "The Legal
Status of Formosa from the Viewpoint of International Law," Formosan Quarterly,
Vol. 1 (1962), pp. 37-38; Tung-pi Chen, "Legal Status of Formosa," Philippine
International Law Journal, Vol. IV (1965), Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 99-151; Chen and
Lasswell, Formosa, China and the United Nations (New York, 1967), pp. 87-95;
Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281, 282-285 (1959). For opposing views,
see: Frank P. Morello, The International Legal Status of Formosa (The Hague,
1966); Chao Yin-ming, "The Sovereignty of Taiwan from View-Point of International
Law," Political Review (Taipei), Vol. 13, No. 12 (reprinted in the Central Daily

News (Taipei), 5 March 1965); Premier Chou En-lai's cable to the UN Secretary

General on 24 August 1950 (UN Doc. S/1715; UN Security Council, 5th Year,
Official Records, 490th Sess., p. 9; Foreign Languages Press, Important Documents
Concerning the Question of Taiwan, No. 22 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955);
Address by President Chiang Kai-shek, 8 February 1955, Free China Review (Taipei),
No. 3 (1955); Shao Chin-fu, Oppose the New U.S. Plots to Create "Two Chinas"

(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962).
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of occupation army has not been altered either by the peace treaties
with Japan, or by the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States
and the Republic of China. Therefore the present position of the
Nationalist Government in Taiwan can only be defined as an exiled
government which administers on behalf of allied powers a former
colonial territory detached from Japan, and to which, by international
law, the local inhabitants are not bound by any duty of allegiance.7
Third, there is the perpetual nature of the purported "state of
siege" proclaimed by the Nationalist Government over Taiwan. Clinging
to the fiction that it is the sole legitimate government of all China,
the Nationalist Government views the Communist victory in China as
nothing but a "state of Communist rebellion." Therefore, the "national
emergency" or "martial law" declared by the Government when it was
evicted from China must last as long as the "period of Communist
rebellion," that is, until the Nationalist Government "recovers" the
Chinese Mainland. The permanent character of the "state of siege,"
"national emergency" or "martial law" in Taiwan resulting from this
position also gives foundation to the charge that the Government's
tenacious refusal to accept reality and its exertions to perpetuate
indefinitely this two-decade-old abnormality are simply grossly cynical
devices to suspend the constitutional guarantees, deny political freedom
and suppress the legitimate aspirations of the local population, all for
the convenience of the authoritarian control of the regime.
Fourth, the local inhabitants have not participated to a fair and
reasonable degree in the making of the laws in question. Of the 1,500-odd
members of the National Assembly which resolved to give the President
extraordinary emergency powers, the representatives of the people of
Taiwan numbered 32; of about 460 members of the Legislative Yuan
which passed the above special laws, the representatives from Taiwan
numbered 17. The paradoxical fact is that it is the inhabitants in
Taiwan who are now bearing the brunt of those laws which were enacted
purportedly to cope with a "Communist rebellion" in which they had
no part. Since the Nationalist Government was exiled to Taiwan 21
years ago, any attempt to point out the fact that the war between the
Nationalist and the Communist Chinese has become verbal rather than
military and the situation has become well stabilized, to urge the
Government to face and accept reality, to demand that the Government
normalize the situation and restore civil liberties, or to suggest that the
political future of Taiwan should be determined in accordance with
the principle of self-determination by all inhabitants in Taiwan has been

71 Cf. Articles 67-68, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 12 August 1949, T.I.A.S. No. 3365; and also J. G. Starke, Introduction to InternationalLaw (6th ed., London, 1967), pp. 448-452.
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regarded by the regime as the gravest of political offences and dealt with
as sedition in accordance with the laws discussed above.
In brief, the peculiar situation in Taiwan with regard to political
crime may be summarized as follows: in a former colony over which
the sovereignty is still undetermined, an exiled government continues to
enforce, for an indefinite period, emergency laws on political offences
which were originally aimed at opponents in a civil war, and which are
now turned instead to the local inhabitants who had no part in the
civil war and who did not participate in the making of the laws.
5. Some comments are now called for about the laws themselves
and problems related to them. It should be noted that it is a fine point in
international law to try to define how far and how long an occupational
government is entitled, in administering a territory of unsettled legal
status on behalf of its allies, to enforce upon local inhabitants who owe
no legal allegiance to it a set of highly political "emergency" laws which
presuppose the absolute allegiance of those subject to them. It should
also be pointed out that in view of the actual situation the laws discussed
above are no longer to be regarded as exceptional, temporary legislation
amidst a short-term national crisis; rather they have become regular,
permanent norms rigidly and severely imposed on political life in Taiwan.
The question of the constitutionality itself of some of those laws
can readily be raised. Article 9 of the Constitution reads: "Except those
in active military service, no person shall be subject to trial by a
military court."' 72 The provision is flat and without qualification. It can
only be interpreted to mean that a civilian shall be tried by a military
court under no circumstances. Not even the proclamation of the state
of siege or the enforcement of the martial law can make an exception to
this clause. Article 171 of the Constitution further provides: "Laws that
are in conflict with the Constitution shall be null and void." In view of
73
these provisions in the Constitution, Article 8 of the Martial Law and
74
Article 2 of the Criminal Law of the Armed Forces, which place certain
offences committed by civilians under the jurisdiction of the military
courts, are in flagrant conflict with the Constitution and must be
considered as null and void. Again, by Article 8 of the Constitution,
Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. Except in case of flagrante
delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained
otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished otherwise
than by a law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by

See n. 6 above.
See n. 5 above.
74 See n.25 above.
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law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted.
Nevertheless, the system of political detention has been established
and carried out by administrative order, not by legislation, and has the
effect of detaining a person for an unlimited period without trial by a
law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The unconstitutionality of this system is too obvious to warrant further comment.
Another point should be made regarding the wording of the laws.
Whether or not this is the intention, the language used in them is often
so broad and ambiguous that it is hardly possible to define the exact
meaning. Thus, in interpretation and application of the laws, great
discretion can be exercised by the military court itself. For instance,
Article 8 (I) (b) of the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of
Rebels reads: "Those who commit lesser [political] offences and need
reform shall be sent for reform." 75 This clause has been implemented by
administrative orders. But nowhere are the terms "lesser political offences"
and "need reform" defined, so that whether or not a person should be
subject to political detention is completely at the discretion of the security
organ. For those who "circulate rumours and beguile the public," capital
punishment is mandatory according to Paragraph D (1) of the
Proclamation of the State of Siege of 1949, and those who "circulate
rumours or transmit unfounded information to disturb public order and
peace and beguile the people" are punishable by from seven years' to life
imprisonment according to Article 6 of the Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion. Since the terms "rumour" and "beguile" are too vague to be
defined, the military courts have been able freely to define as "rumour"
or "unfounded information" any material unflattering to the Government
and inflict penalties on anyone so convicted. According to Article 7 of the
Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, those who "make propaganda in
favour of rebels by letter, book or speech" are punishable by imprisonment
for not less than seven years. And since the Nationalist Government
considers itself still in a state of war with the Communist Government, any
criticism or attack, verbal or written, on the Government is automatically
judged by the military courts to be "propaganda in favour of rebels."
According to Article 5 of the Statute for Punishment of Rebellion, those
who "participate in a rebellious organization or meeting" are punishable
by life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than 10 years, and the
court's interpretation of the term "organization" is so broad that a
medical doctor was indicted under this article because she had once been
recruited to work (i.e., "participate") in a Communist public clinic

75 Seen. 16 above.
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(i.e., "rebellious organization") in China before taking refuge in Taiwan. 76
For those who "disrupt the money market," capital punishment is
mandatory by Paragraph D (3) of the Proclamation of the State of
Siege, and the terms "disrupt" and "money market" are so vague and
broad that they could in effect cover the whole range of transactions. In
fact, the military courts consider themselves empowered to try under
this article any trader who raises commodity prices "unreasonably."7
Upon reading the laws, one is struck both by the severity of the
penalties prescribed and by apparent imbalances or contradictions among
those penalties. For instance, the Proclamation of the State of Siege
prescribes mandatory capital punishment for anyone who "circulates
rumours and beguiles the public... strikes or encourages students to
strike... incites the public to riot... disrupts the money market"
(Paragraph D, the Proclamation of the State of Siege). 78 Capital
punishment for the sort of offences mentioned above is rather stem, but
equally peculiar is that much lighter penalties are provided for apparently
far more grave offences, such as "to prepare or conspire to destroy the
national polity, seize state territory, change the constitution by illegal
means or overthrow the Government" (punishable by imprisonment for
not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion); "to prepare or conspire to deliver a government army to rebels
or lead an army to surrender to rebels" (punishable by imprisonment for
not less than three years and not more than 10 years, Article 3 (II),
Statute for Punishment of Rebellion); "to prepare or conspire to
communicate with a foreign state or its agent with intent that such state
or another state begin war against the Republic of China" (punishable by
imprisonment for not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion); or "to prepare or conspire to communicate
with a foreign state or its agent with intent to subject territory of the
Republic of China to such state or another state" (punishable by
imprisonment for not less than 10 years, Article 2 (III), Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion). On the other hand, penalties prescribed
for similar offences sometimes vary according to different laws: Paragraph
D of the Proclamation of the State of Siege provides mandatory capital
punishment for a person who "circulates rumours and beguiles the
public," while according to Article 6 of the Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion, a person who "circulates rumours or transmits unfounded
information to disturb public peace and order and beguiles the people" is

76 She lived in the cell next to the author's in 1965 in the Taiwan Garrison Command
prison at Ching-tao Road in TaipeL
7 It has become a practice of the Garrison Command, when commodity prices rise,
publicly to warn traders of possible indictment and "severe punishment" under
this law.
78 See n. 4 above.
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punishable with imprisonment for life or for not less than seven years.
Thus a military court is free to invoke either of these two clauses to
render its sentence for the same offence. This perhaps reflects the state of
confusion during the period when the Nationalist Government was evicted
from Mainland China, when these laws were enacted with panicky haste.
The character of the military court is overwhelmingly political. It
is true that Article 80 of the Chinese Nationalist Constitution reads:
"Judges shall be above partisanship and shall, in accordance with law,
hold trials independently, free from any interference," 7 9 and Article 160
of the Military Trial Law states: "A court-martial shall independently
perform its functions of trial, free from any interference whatsoever."
Article 19 of the same law also reads: "No military law enforcement
officer shall, during his term of office, participate in any partisan
activities." 80 Judicial independence, however, is something the Nationalist
Government in its half-century's history has never achieved in a civil
court, let alone in a military one. The officer-judge of a military court is
anxious only to prove his loyalty to the regime by subjecting his decisions
to government policy. Independence of the military court is rendered
even more unthinkable by the very quality of the officer-judges themselves,
and by the fact that the court is administratively an integral part of, and
tightly controlled by, the omnipotent Garrison Command of Taiwan,
headquarters of secret intelligence services whose responsibility is to
assure the island's security in the broadest sense of the word. As a
matter of fact, before its delivery, the court's decision on a political
case must be "approved" by the security organ which arrested and
investigated the defendants and which reserves the right to ask the court
to alter its planned sentence, usually to the defendant's disadvantage. The
courts always presume the defendant's guilt by taking the position that
if one were not guilty he would not have been arrested and brought to
the court. As the defendant has no right to withhold facts, he is compelled
to keep building up the case against himself. Under these conditions,
when a defendant is brought to trial, he is as good as convicted.
It may be of some socio-criminological interest to note that certain
traditional Chinese penal conceptions have emerged in the Nationalist
Government's methods for dealing with political offences. This gives the
whole matter a certain Oriental flavour:
1. The system of denunciation. The duty of citizens, backed up
by legal sanctions, to denounce political offenders has been formally
incorporated into the Statute for Denunciation and Suppression of
Rebels.n Article 4 of the Statute prescribes: "Whoever discovers a rebel
n. 6 above.
See n. 17 above.
81See n. 16 above.
79 See
80
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or suspect must secretly denounce him to local authorities or security
organs. The authority concerned shall keep secret the identity of the
denouncer." Article 9 of the Statute further provides: "Whoever fails
to denounce or shields a rebel or suspect shall be punished with
imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years." As
indicated above, because of these provisions, the leniencies accorded by
the Criminal Code to a criminal offender's family who has shielded the
offender are denied to the political offender's family.
2. The system of collective responsibility and guilt by association.
There is a strong tendency on the part of the Government to adhere to the
conception of collective responsibility and guilt by association in dealing
with political offences. The "guarantee" system has been widely adopted
as a security measure. Students above the junior high-school level, teachers
in all public and private schools at all levels, all military personnel, civil
servants, office and factory workers and persons associated with any kind
of organization are required by law to offer at least two guarantors to the
effect that the guarantee holds and will hold "pure and correct thoughts,"
is not and will not be engaged in any "anti-governmental" activity, and
that the guarantors will accept "severe punishment" if the guarantee fails
to live up to the terms of this guarantee. Article 5 of the Statute for
Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels 82 provides:
The heads of chia, liand lin8 3 must constantly and vigilantly make
security checks of the dwellings in their areas. All personnel in offices,
military units, schools, factories and all other organizations must have
at least two security-guarantors. If anyone is discovered to be a
rebel, his guarantors and direct superior shall be severely punished.
The same rule applies to any person applying for a passport or
exit permit.
When someone is arrested or imprisoned for a political offence, he
will not be released even if found not guilty, or even if he has served
the full term of his sentence without oflering guarantors for his future
behaviour and thoughts.
On the other hand, as a matter of practice, the members of the
family, relatives and close friends of political offenders are automatically
considered to be co-conspirators and suspects and are subject to various
82

Id.

For security and administrative reasons, all dwellings in Taiwan are organized by
law into certain units and put under police supervision. The basic unit is the
made up of about
lin,
which consists of about 10 households; above it is the li,
10 fin;
according to the statutes, the chia is the next unit above this, but the unit
actually in use in Taiwan is called the ch'u. Each unit has its own head who is
responsible to the police and supervises the members of the households under his
jurisdiction.
83
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kinds of punishment and harassment, such as arrest, imprisonment,
refusal of loans, denial of passports and exit permits, dismissal from
public or private office, etc.
3. The monetary reward system. Monetary rewards are given on
a case-by-case basis to the security agents, investigators, prosecutors
and judges of the military court who have dealt with a case of
political offence. The amount of the prize is in proportion to the
severity of the sentence rendered. At present, a reward of about U.S.
$5,000 is given for each death sentence rendered, to be distributed
among all persons involved. The amount of the prize decreases on
a graduated scale according to whether the sentence is life imprisonment,
15 years' imprisonment, etc., down to three years' imprisonment, which
is the starting-point of the reward system.84
4. The requirement of public repentance. Every effort is made
to make each political prisoner repent publicly in the court and thank
the Government for giving him the opportunity to repent. Although
public repentance will not necessarily lighten his sentence, this seems
to have become a matter of face for the regime.
The protection of a defendant's rights is provided for in the
Chinese Nationalist laws. For example, Article 8 of the Constitution,
quoted above,a5 contains such provisions, and the Law of Habeas
Corpus 86 further states:
Article 1. If a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by
any organization other than a court, he himself or another person
may apply to the district court at the place of arrest or detention
or the high court having jurisdiction over the district court for
issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
Article 2. When a person is arrested or detained, the executing
organization shall immediately notify in writing the said person and
his designated relative or friend of the reason for his arrest or
detention. Such notification shall be made not later than 24 hours.

84 Although the Government has never made public the details of this what may be
called built-in incentive system, its existence is common knowledge in Taiwan. During
the period of 1964-65 when the author was in prison in Taipei, and of 1965-69 when
he was under security surveillance, all the security agents of various ranks he talked

to, including Major Wang of the Political Warfare Department of the Garrison
Command, Mr. Wang, head of the Public Information Department of Investigation

Bureau, Ministry of Justice, and Mr. Liu, who was assigned to the surveillance of
the author, freely, and with a certain air of pride, admitted the existence of this
reward system and apparently believed it was an efficient and reasonable way to
operate the security apparatus.
8
5 See n. 6 above.
86 Law of Habeas Corpus, promulgated on 22 June 1935, effective from 15 March
1936, and amended on 26 April 1938.
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The person arrested or his friend or relative may also request
the notification specified in the preceding paragraph.
Article 5. If the court deems the application justifiable, it shall
issue a writ of habeas corpus within 24 hours to the organization
executing the arrest or detention, and at the same time notify thereof
the organization immediately superior thereto.
Article 7. The organization executing the arrest or detention
shall, after receiving the writ of habeas corpus, hand over the person
arrested or detained within 24 hours. If it has sent the person
arrested or detained to another organization prior to the receipt of
the writ of habeas corpus, it shall immediately reply to the court to
this effect and, at the same time, forward the writ of habeas corpus
to the organization to which the person has been sent. The latter
shall hand over the person directly to the competent court within
24 hours. If the court sends for the person arrested or detained, he
shall be handed over immediately.
Article 8. If the court, after examining the person arrested
or detained, finds the arrest or detention unjustifiable, it shall
release him immediately.
The above provisions are quite adequate, but they have not been
enforced, despite the Government's repeated public assurances of its
willingness to abide by the law. In fact, a political offender, once
arrested, is without exception held strictly incommunicado for from
several months to several years. It is only after a formal charge is made
and indictment drawn up against him that the prisoner is allowed to
hire and see any lawyer. For more serious cases, the prisoner is not
allowed to see any lawyer even after formal indictment. The trial is secret.
According to Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 87 and
Article 109 of the Military Trial Law,8u when an accused person is
examined, no violence, threat, inducement, fraud or other improper
means shall be used. But in fact all those means are commonly used
against an accused. The third-degree method too is often adopted.
5. Until the 1950s, political offenders often simply disappeared or
were executed en masse after roll-call without trial. Although the public
execution of political offenders is rare today and efforts are made to maintain the appearance of legality, the situation has remained substantially
unchanged. There are two basic factors which contribute to this situation.
First, the Chinese Nationalist regime bases its very existence on
fiction and myth. The fiction that the Government in Taiwan is the sole
legitimate government of all China and the myth that this Government

The Code of Criminal Procedure, promulgated on 1 January 1935, effective from
1 July 1935 and amended on 25 December 1945 and on 28 January 1967.
88 See n. 46 above.
87
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will in the near future "recover" the Mainland of China constitute
the foundation of the Government and its state policy. From this
position, the regime has proclaimed a state of siege and imposed martial
law for the past two decades, and is resolved to maintain this state for an
indefinite period of time in the future. This permanent state of "national
crisis" has had a fatal impact on political life in Taiwan.
Second, there is no real intention on the part of the Nationalist
regime to abide by its own laws in the matter of political offences. It
is too readily inclined to take recourse to extra-legal means in dealing
with critics and opposition.
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APPENDIX
Acts Constituting PoliticalCrimes for Civilians under Nationalist Laws
(1) Strikes, demonstrations, petitions or public meetings (C and D, Proclamation of 19 May 1949).
(2) Encouraging students to strike (D, Proclamation of 19 May 1949).
(3) Spreading of rumours by letter, slogan or other means (C, Proclamation
of 19 May 1949).
(4) Undertaking to destroy the national polity, seize state territory, change the
constitution by illegal means, or overthrow the Government (Article 100 [I],
Criminal Code; Article 2 [I], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(5) Preparing or conspiring to commit the above offence (Article 100 [II],
Criminal Code; Article 2 [III], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(6) Committing the offence prescribed in (4) above with violence (Article
101 [I], Criminal Code; Article 2 [I], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(7) Preparing or conspiring to commit the above offence (Article 101 [II],
Criminal Code; Article 2 [1II], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(8) Communicating with a foreign state or its agent with the intent that such
state or another state shall begin war against the Republic of China (Article 103
(I], Criminal Code; Article 2 I], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(9) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 103 [II], Criminal
Code; Article 2 [H], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(10) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (8) above
(Article 103
III], Criminal Code; Article 2 [III], Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion).
(11) Communicating with a foreign state or its agent with intent to subject
territory of the Republic of China to such state or another state (Article 104 [I],
Criminal Code; Article 2 [I], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(12) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 104 [I], Criminal Code;
Article 2 [II], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(13) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (11) above
(Article 104 [III], Criminal Code; Article 2 [III], Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion).
(14) (A citizen of the Republic of China) serving in the armed forces of an
enemy or bearing arms for an enemy against the Republic of China or against an ally
of the Republic of China (Article 105 [I], Criminal Code).
(15) Attempting to commit the above offences (Article 105 [II], Criminal
Code).
(16) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (14) above
(Article 105 [III], Criminal Code).
(17) Rendering military aid to an enemy or causing injury to the military
interests of the Republic of China or its ally during a war with a foreign state or
when a war is imminent (Article 106 [I], Criminal Code).
(18) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 106 [II], Criminal
Code).
(19) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (17) above
(Article 106 [III], Criminal Code).
(20) Disclosing or delivering a document, plan, piece of information or other
thing of a secret nature concerning the defence of the Republic of China (Article
109 11, Criminal Code).
(21) Disclosing or delivering to a foreign state or to its agent a document,
plan, piece of information or other thing mentioned above (Article 109 [II],
Criminal Code).
(22) Attempting to commit the offence prescribed in (20) or (21) above
(Article 109 [III], Criminal Code).
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(23) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (20) or (21)
above (Article 109 [IV], Criminal Code).
(24) Searching out or gathering a document, plan, piece of information, or
other thing mentioned in (20) above (Article 111 [I], Criminal Code).
(25) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 111 [II], Criminal
Code).
(26) Preparing or conspiring to commit the offence prescribed in (24) above
(Article 111 [III], Criminal Code).
(27) Secretly agreeing without authority with a foreign government or its agent
on matters which require the authorization of the Government (Article 113, Criminal
Code).
(28) Participating in a rebellious organization or meeting (Article 5, Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(29) Circulating rumours or transmitting unfounded information to disturb
public peace and order and beguile the people (Article 6, Statute for Punishment
of Rebellion).
(30) Making propaganda in favour of rebels by letter, book or speech (Article
7, Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(31) Delivering an army to rebels (Article 3 [I], Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion).
(32) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 3 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(33) Delivering to rebels fortresses, military ports, ships, aviation materials,
railroad cars, arms, ammunition, telegraphic and communication materials, military
constructions or war munitions (Article 4 [I] [a], Statute for Punishment of
Rebellion).
(34) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [H], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(35) Divulging or delivering to rebels military or political secret papers, charts,
information or articles (Article 4 [I] [b], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(36) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 1II], Statute for the
Punishment of Rebellion).
(37) Recruiting soldiers or workers for rebels (Article 4 [I] [c], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(38) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(39) Purchasing, transporting or making arms, ammunition or other materials
for rebels (Article 4 [I] [d], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(40) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(41) Acting as guide or searching, collecting or transmitting military secrets
for rebels (Article 4 [I] [e], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(42) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(43) Collecting money or articles for rebels, or supplying money or capital to
rebels (Article 4 [I] [f], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
(44) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(45) Protecting or shielding rebels (Article 4 [I] [g], Statute for Punishment
of Rebellion).
(46) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(47) Inciting students, workers or traders to strike or to disrupt the public
peace and order or disrupting the money market under rebel direction or in favour
of rebels (Article 4 [I] [j], Statute for Punishment of Rebellion).
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(48) Attempting to commit the above offence (Article 4 [II], Statute for
Punishment of Rebellion).
(49) Failing knowingly to denounce rebels (Article 9, Statute for Denunciation
and Suppression of Rebels).
(50) Knowingly shielding, purchasing, keeping, making brokerage of, transporting or administering under an assumed name rebel property (Article 13, Statute for
Denunciation and Suppression of Rebels).
(51) Serving as a spy for an enemy or rendering aid to an enemy's spy (Article
18 [b], Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
(52) Acting as a guide or supplying topographical information to an enemy
(Article 18 [d], Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
(53) Acting as a pilot for an enemy or enabling through fraudulent means an
enemy to enter a naval base or other defence establishment (Article 18 Eel, Criminal
Law of the Armed Forces).
(54) Rendering aid to an enemy to the detriment of the military interest of
one's country (Article 20, Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
(55) Inciting an army to rebel (Article 21, Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
(56) Attempting to commit the above offences (51), (52), (53) and (54)
(Article 22, Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
(57) Preparing or conspiring to commit the above offences (51), (52), (53)
and (54) (Article 23, Criminal Law of the Armed Forces).
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